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Quantum Risk for Law Firms: Privilege, Retention and Client Data

Sectors

Quantum Academy8 min read

A law firm’s quantum exposure is the set of client matters that must stay confidential for decades and that the firm sends over connections protected by RSA or elliptic-curve key exchange. Anyone who records that traffic today can decrypt it once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) exists, meaning one large and reliable enough to run Shor’s algorithm against the keys in use. That attack is called harvest now, decrypt later, or HNDL. A trust deed emailed to a client today may need to stay confidential for the client’s lifetime. A draft press release for a deal due to be announced in four months needs to stay confidential only until the announcement.

Three first steps follow. Classify matters by secrecy horizon, ask the five vendors that store or send your longest-horizon matters for post-quantum roadmaps, and check the formats your e-signature platform and archives use.

Privilege doesn’t reduce this exposure. It protects a communication from compelled disclosure in legal proceedings, and it does nothing to stop someone reading a copy they’ve decrypted. ABA Model Rule 1.6(c) requires a lawyer to “make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client.” In Formal Opinion 477R (May 2017), the ABA says that “if client information is of sufficient sensitivity, a lawyer should encrypt the transmission.” A secrecy horizon is a measure of how long that sensitivity lasts.

Secrecy horizons by practice area

A matter’s secrecy horizon is the number of years after a document is sent during which its disclosure would still harm the client. It’s the X in Michele Mosca’s inequality (see which data is actually at risk from harvest now, decrypt later). If X plus the years your migration takes (Y) is greater than the years until a CRQC exists (Z), recordings made now are exposed.

Practice areaWhat stays secretSecrecy horizon
M&APrice and terms before announcement. For a deal that never happens, the diligence findings and the fact that talks took placeMonths for an announced deal. No end date for an abandoned one
PatentsInvention disclosures and draft applicationsUntil publication, normally 18 months after the earliest filing date in the US
Trade secretsThe secret itself, in litigation and licensing filesAs long as the owner keeps it secret
DisputesStrategy, privileged advice, settlement termsStrategy until judgment or settlement. Settlement terms for as long as the confidentiality clause runs
Trusts and estatesBeneficiaries, assets, family arrangements, letters of wishesThe client’s lifetime, and after

Under 35 U.S.C. 122(b), the USPTO publishes an application “promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date”, with some exceptions. A trade secret has no expiration date. Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, information qualifies only while its owner takes “reasonable measures to keep such information secret” and it isn’t generally known (18 U.S.C. 1839(3)). For trusts and estates, the US Supreme Court held in Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998) that attorney-client privilege continues after the client’s death.

Retention is a different number

Your firm’s records retention schedule already has a number of years for each matter type. For HNDL, it’s the wrong number. A retention period is how long the firm keeps its own copy. Destroying that copy at the end of the period does nothing to a recording someone made of the documents in transit. The duty doesn’t end either. Under ABA Model Rule 1.9(c), a lawyer who formerly represented a client shall not “reveal information relating to the representation” except as the rules permit, with no time limit.

Three matters, one week

Suppose three matters open in the same week of November 2026. The first is a share purchase announced in March 2027, so an adversary can use a recording of the draft announcement only if a CRQC exists before then. The second is a patent application filed in January 2027, which the USPTO would normally publish in July 2028. The third is a discretionary trust for a 50-year-old client, where the deed and the letter of wishes stay confidential for the client’s lifetime and after it.

Nobody knows Z. You don’t need it to rank these three. A CRQC that exists before the share purchase is announced in March 2027, or before the patent application’s expected publication in July 2028, also exposes the trust. A CRQC that exists ten years from now exposes only the trust.

Until your vendors switch to post-quantum key exchange, every trust document the firm sends has a horizon of decades, while an adversary gains nothing from the share purchase documents after the March 2027 announcement. If the deal fails, its diligence file belongs on the urgent list with the trust.

Where encryption protects client data

The systems below all rely on TLS, the protocol that encrypts web sessions and server-to-server email. Each TLS session starts with a key exchange, in which the two ends agree on a session key using public-key cryptography, and that exchange is the part a CRQC breaks.

  • Email gateways. Mail between the firm’s service and a client’s is encrypted in transit only if the two servers negotiate TLS, and they can agree only on a key exchange both support. S/MIME-encrypted mail has a second exposure. The key for each message is encrypted to the recipient’s RSA or elliptic-curve public key (RFC 8551), so every stored copy contains what a CRQC needs.
  • Client portals, extranets and data rooms. Every login, page view and download is encrypted with TLS between a browser and the vendor’s servers.
  • Document management. Lawyers’ devices and integrated services such as email filing and e-signature connect to a cloud document management system (DMS) over TLS.
  • E-signature platforms. Signing sessions use TLS. When the platform applies its own digital signature to the completed PDF, the signed copy has a second kind of exposure.

That second kind concerns authenticity, not secrecy. Someone with a CRQC could derive the platform’s private key from its public certificate and sign an altered agreement that verifies. The signature on an executed agreement shows the document is unaltered only while its algorithm is unbroken on the day someone relies on it.

Files a vendor stores under AES-256 are less urgent. In its draft transition plan, IR 8547, NIST says it doesn’t expect to need to replace symmetric standards such as AES.

Vendor dependence

In each of these systems, the vendor decides which key exchanges its servers accept and which algorithm its platform signs documents with. If the firm runs email, document management, data rooms and e-signature as cloud services, its IT team configures none of those choices. The firm’s Y is the latest date among the vendors that store or send documents in its long-horizon matters.

NIST standardized ML-KEM (Kyber), a key-encapsulation mechanism, in FIPS 203 and ML-DSA (Dilithium), a signature algorithm, in FIPS 204, both on August 13, 2024. RFC 10024 (August 2026) specifies hybrid TLS 1.3 groups that combine ML-KEM with a classical exchange, such as X25519MLKEM768. For signed and encrypted documents, the IETF has specified ML-DSA (RFC 9882, October 2025) and ML-KEM (RFC 9936, March 2026) for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), the format that S/MIME messages and PDF signatures use.

In Formal Opinion 477R, the ABA applies Model Rule 5.3 to outside services such as online storage, and says that where the client didn’t choose the vendor, “the lawyer has the responsibility to monitor how those services are being performed.”

Financial-sector clients are planning against dates of their own. In a January 2026 roadmap for the financial sector that it describes as non-binding, the G7 Cyber Expert Group suggests addressing the most critical systems in 2030–32 and includes relevant third-party dependencies in the cryptographic inventory. Write down the firm’s answer before a client asks for it in a security questionnaire.

Three first steps

Classify matters by secrecy horizon

Add a secrecy-horizon field to matter intake, with a default for each practice area from the table above, and let the responsible partner raise it. Sort open matters and the archive by that field. Matters with a horizon over ten years are your HNDL list. For each matter type on the list, record the systems the firm uses to send and store its documents.

Ask your top five vendors for post-quantum roadmaps

Pick the five vendors whose systems store or send the most long-horizon documents. Ask each one in writing:

  1. Which key exchange its servers negotiate today with your users and your clients.
  2. Which release will add hybrid ML-KEM key exchange, and whether the published roadmap lists it.
  3. The name and revision date of the internal document that contains its post-quantum plan.
  4. For e-signature and secure email, which algorithm it uses to sign or encrypt completed documents today, and when ML-DSA or ML-KEM will be available.

For how to word these so a vendor that has done the work can’t answer the same way as one that hasn’t, see getting vendors to answer the right questions.

Check e-signature and archive formats

For agreements that may have to be proved decades from now, such as long leases, IP licenses and settlement agreements, find out what the stored PDF contains. Ask the e-signature vendor which PAdES level its completed documents meet. PAdES is ETSI’s standard for advanced electronic signatures in PDF files. At its B-LTA level, the file includes document time-stamps meant to allow “validation of the signature long time after its generation” (ETSI EN 319 142-1), and a new time-stamp can be added when the last one’s validation data is at risk of obsolescence. If the time-stamps are to protect the signature against a CRQC, the newest one has to use a post-quantum signature such as ML-DSA. Someone has to add that time-stamp while RSA and ECDSA are still unbroken.

Your IT team can read the algorithms from a stored copy with poppler’s pdfsig and OpenSSL:

pdfsig -dump executed-agreement.pdf
for f in executed-agreement.pdf.sig*; do openssl cms -cmsout -print -inform DER -in "$f" | grep -A1 -E 'eContentType|signatureAlgorithm'; done

Each .sig file is one signature or time-stamp. A file whose eContentType is id-smime-ct-TSTInfo is a document time-stamp. An algorithm line such as rsaEncryption or ecdsa-with-SHA256, or any other line that names RSA or ECDSA, means a classical signature that a CRQC could forge.

Our Quantum-Safe Legal and Professional Services course covers post-quantum awareness for law and accounting firms and advisory practices, including privilege and HNDL exposure, document management systems, client advisory obligations and professional liability.

Start with the five open matters that have the longest secrecy horizons. List every system the firm used to send or store their documents in the last month, with the vendor that runs it. A vendor that appears on all five lists gets the roadmap questions first.