Where Every Country Stands on Post-Quantum Migration
More than a dozen national authorities have published post-quantum deadlines. They agree on 2035 and disagree on almost everything before it. A field guide…
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More than a dozen national authorities have published post-quantum deadlines. They agree on 2035 and disagree on almost everything before it. A field guide…
Germany expects hybrid key exchange. Australia expects pure ML-KEM. The US sets a date for dropping the classical half. What to build when the…
NIST IR 8547 is usually reduced to 2035. It sets two dates, and the earlier one is already shaping procurement and risk acceptance decisions.
Approved algorithm lists are the first of four axes on which national post-quantum requirements diverge. The other three are harder to abstract away.
Hybrid key exchange and dual signatures, explained from the combiner outward: what goes into the KDF, what the extra kilobytes cost, and how to…
Three national agencies advise against QKD for their own networks. Twenty-seven EU states are funding one. Both positions hold, and the reason explains how…
The algorithms are standardised. The plumbing around them was sized for 32-byte keys. Here is where post-quantum objects break real infrastructure, and what to…
Operators face two problems enterprises mostly don't: most of their cryptography is written by someone else, and every cryptographic relationship has a counterparty they…
Algorithm swaps almost never happen cleanly. A more useful definition of crypto-agility, and the four mitigation patterns architects can deploy before a full replacement…
Quantum key distribution moves the trust boundary rather than removing it. A working guide to trusted nodes, device-level attacks, and the questions to ask…